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BANK MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT: SOME CHIPS
IN THE DOCTRINE OF POTENTIAL COMPETITION?
EUGENE J. MEIGHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal and state regulatory restraints upon entry into markets
have been an important factor throughout the relatively brief history
of the federal government's attack against bank mergers. Even in
the Justice Department's initial cases under the Bank Merger Act of
1960' and the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 2
 in which horizontal
mergers between direct competitors in local metropolitan areas were
challenged, such restraints were significant. 3
 In these cases the
Department's success in persuading the courts to protect competition
between direct competitors was attributable in part to the emphasis
placed upon the local character of commercial bank activities and to
* B.A., St. Louis 'University, 1961; J.D., St. Louis University, 1964; LL.M. Yale
University, 1965; Member, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C.
' 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970).
2 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970). Responsibility for approving bank mergers under the
substantive standards of the Bank Merger Act of 1966 is allocated among the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
depending upon whether the resulting bank is to be a national bank, a state member bank, or
a non-member insured bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (1970). The "responsible agency" is
forbidden to approve
any other proposed merger transaction whose effect in any section of the country
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which
in any other manner will be in restraint of trade, unless it finds that the anticompeti-
tive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest
by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the
community to be served.
. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(11) (1970). Following approval of a proposed merger transaction by the
responsible agency, there is a thirty-day period within which the Department of Justice may
commence an action to challenge the merger. Consummation of the merger is stayed by the
commencement of an ahtitrust action brought by the Attorney General, and "in any such
action, the court shall review de novo the issues presented." 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (1970).
For a comprehensive survey of bank merger law, see Kintner & Hansen, A Review of the
Law of Bank Mergers, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 213 (1972).
3 See United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 368-69 (1970);
United Stites v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 184-85 (1968); United States v. First Nat'l
Bank, 376 U.S. 665, 668(1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-55
(1963).
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the existence of barriers to entry into local bank markets imposed by
the regulatory process. 4
 In addition, regulatory barriers have been
important factors in the series of market extension bank merger
cases lost by the Department of Justice in recent years. 5 In all of
these cases the district court was confronted with testimony by
representatives of the appropriate regulatory agencies questioning
the likelihood that the acquiring bank would have received approval
for de novo entry into the target market in lieu of the acquisition,
and in some cases the testimony indicated that state statutes ren-
dered entry by means other than acquisition difficult or impossible. 6
The importance of federal and state restrictions upon bank
mergers was recently underscored in United States v. Marine Ban-
corporation, Inc. 7 and United States v. Connecticut National
Bank, 8
 two cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1974. These
cases involved the application of the potential competition doctrine,
a theory which essentially holds that a merger which eliminates a
potential entrant from a market, and which therefore substantially
lessens competition, is illegal9
 under section 7 of the Clayton Act."'
• E.g., Brief for Appellant at 5-7, United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
399 U.S. 350 (1970).
See United States v. United Va. Bankshares, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 891, 894 (E.D. Va.
1972); United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003, 1015 (D. Colo.
1971), did mem., 410 U.S. 577 (1973); United States v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 315 F. Supp.
261, 271 (D. Idaho 1970); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 310 F. Supp. 157, 185 (D. Md.
1970); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 301 F. Supp. 1161, 1199-1201 (S.D. Miss. 1969);
United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 183-84 (N.D. Cal. 1967)
(3-judge court).
6 United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003, 1015 (D. Colo.
1971), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 577 (1973), involved a Colorado statute prohibiting branch
banking, although common ownership of two or more separate banks by a holding company
was not forbidden. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-1 (Cum. Supp. 1969). In United States v.
First Nat'l Bank, 310 F. Supp. 157 (D. Md. 1970), First National could not enter Harford
County under its own name, except by acquisition of First National Bank of Harford County,
since a Maryland statute, 1 Md. Ann. Code art. 11, § 29 (1968), prohibited the use of a name
by a bank if that name was similar to the name of any other bank in the same county or city.
310 F. Supp. at 185.
7 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
418 U.S. 656 (1974).
9
 The potential competition theory was first employed in United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964): "We would have to wear blinders not to see that the
mere efforts of [the acquiring company] to get into the California market, though unsuccess-
ful, had a powerful influence on [existing competitor's] business attitudes within the State."
Id. at 659. The Supreme Court subsequently elaborated upon the conceptual basis for the
doctrine in United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), stating: " IP]otential
competition ... as a substitute for . .. [actual competition] may restrain producers from
overcharging those to whom they sell or underpaying those from whom they buy. . . .
Potential competition, insofar. as the threat survives . . . may compensate in part for the
imperfection characteristic of actual competition in the great majority of competitive mar-
kets.' " Id. at 174, quoting Wilcox, Competition and Monopoly in American Industry, TNEC
Monograph No. 21, 7-8 (1940). The fact that the parameters of the doctrine are still being
defined is evident in the majority opinion in Marine. 418 U.S. at 623-25, 632-39. The Court's
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In Marine, the Court held that the proposed bank merger was
valid under section 7 because the government had failed to establish
the existence of two preconditions essential to invalidate an acquisi-
tion under the actual potential entrant branch of the potential com-
petition doctrine." These preconditions require the government to
prove that: (1) feasible means of market entry other than merger are
available to the acquiring bank; and (2) entry by these alternative
means offers a substantial likelihood of producing either long-term
deconcentration of the market or other significant procompetitive
effec ts.
Furthermore, the Court rejected the government's alternative
theory that the merger was unlawful under the perceived potential
entrant branch of the potential competition doctrine since it would
eliminate the procompetitive effects that the acquiring bank exerted
while standing on the periphery of the market as a potential en-
trant. 13
 The Court reasoned that the state statutory barriers to
branching after entry minimized the procompetitive effects of the
perceived threat of entry by the acquiring bank, and therefore, that
removal of the perceived threat would not significantly reduce com-
petition in the market." In addition, in both Marine and Connect-
icut National, the Court held that in bank merger cases the "section
of the country" within which the effects upon competition are meas-
ured for purposes of Clayton Act section 7, 15 will remain only those
areas in which the parties to the merger are in actual direct competi-
tion.' 6
 Therefore, the Court rejected the government's contention
application' of the potential competition theory in Marine is examined in text accompanying
notes 111-27 supra.
For general discussion of the potential competition cases, see Berger & Peterson, Con-
glomerate Mergers and Criteria for Defining Potential Entrants, 15 Antitrust Bull. 489 (1970);
Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven; The Limitations of the Anti-
Merger Act, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1231 (1968); Fox, Toehold Acquisitions, Potential Toehold
Acquisitions, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 42 Antitrust L.]. 573 (1973); Robinson,
.Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 163, 180-90 (1974); Note, 86 Harv. L, Rev.
792 .
 (1973); Note, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation: Potential Competition
Reexamined, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 837 (1974); Note, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential
Competition Doctrine, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 156 (1972).
1 ° 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). This section provides in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquiiition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
" 418 U.S. at 638-39.
12
 Id. at 633.
13 Id.
14
 Id. at 639-40.
13 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
16
 Marine, 418 U.S. at 622; Connecticut Bank, 418 U.S. at 667. In Connecticut Bank,
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that the respective states should constitute the appropriate section of
the country, noting the government's concession that the state is not
a banking market."
In Marine, Mr. Justice Powell, who spoke for the Court in both
cases, highlighted the relevance of statutory restraints upon market
entry to the resolution of bank merger cases: "[I]n applying the
potential-competition doctrine to commercial banking, courts must
take  into account the extensive federal and state regulation of
banks, particularly the legal restraints on entry unique to this line of
commerce."' 8
Although the significance of these decisions may be limited
because of the general importance of regulatory factors to bank
mergers and the particular importance of the pertinent state statu-
tory barriers to both entry and expansion," various aspects of the
opinions in Marine and Connecticut National prompt the question
of whether the Court "has chipped away at the policies of the
Clayton Act." 2° Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, rejected the majority's "per se" view that a bank which is
subject to stringent state law limitations upon branching cannot
exert a substantial competitive influence in the market. 21 Rather, it
was maintained in the dissenting opinion that "a large and success-
ful banking organization with wide experience in developing new
markets," could, either immediately or in the forseeable . future,
significantly affect competitive practices within the market. 22 There-
fore, Justice White reasoned, state law restrictions upon branching
should not insulate a merger from the prohibition against removal of
potential competition contained in section 7. 23
 •
Indeed, Mr. Justice White did not confine his dissent in both
cases to a challenge of the significance of state regulatory restraints
upon market entry. The dissenting opinion expressed conceptual
difficulty with the majority's analysis of the role of the potential
competition doctrine in enforcement of the antitrust laws.' The
the Court did not reach the question of the legality of the merger under § 7 because it held
that the district court had incorrectly defined the relevant product and geographic markets.
Id. at 660.
17 Marine, 418 U.S. at 620; Connecticut Bank, 418 U.S. at 667.
$8 418 U.S. at 605-06.
' 9
 See id. at 641. Branching by nationally chartered banks is controlled by pertinent state
laws, since they are permitted to open new branches only to the extent that "such establish-
ment and operation [of new branches] are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by
the law of the State in question; . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
20
 Marine, 418 U.S. at 642 (dissenting opinion).
21
 Id. at 647 (dissenting opinion).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 654 (dissenting °pillion); see Connecticut Bank, 418 U.S. at 675 (dissenting
opinion).
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points of difference between the majority and dissenters suggest that
limitations upon the scope of the potential competition doctrine are
evolving. Thus, the Court has mandated that in a potential competi-
tion 'case involving banks, the only relevant geographic market, or
markets, is the area in which the acquired company is an actual
competitor. 25
 The Court has also indicated that the elimination of
one of the few likely entrants into a concentrated market will violate
section 7 only if the acquiring company has a feasible alternative
means for entering the market which offers the prospect of captur-
ing a substantial position in the market. 26 Finally, the majority
opinion in Marine casts doubt upon the viability of the theory that a
market extension merger may be objectionable solely because of the
elimination of the future beneficial influence of a company which
probably would have entered the market but for the challenged
acquisition. 27
 In order to demonstrate these points, the facts of
Marine and Connecticut National will be summarized.
II. FACTUAL SETTING OF Marine AND Connecticut National
A. The Marine Bancorporation-Washington Trust Merger
Marine Bancorporation, Inc. is a bank-holding company,
whose wholly-owned subsidiary, The National Bank of Commerce
(NBC), is the second largest of the banking organizations with
headquarters in the. State of Washington. As of December 31, 1971,
NBC had total deposits of $1.6 billion and total loans of $881.3
million. NBC has 107 branch banking offices located in northeast-
ern and eastern Washington, 59 of which are in the Seattle Met-
ropolitan area. However, the bank has no branch offices in
Spokane. 28
Washington Trust Bank (WTB), on the other hand, is a state
bank headquartered in Spokane in the extreme eastern part of the
state. This bank is the eighth largest banking organization with
headquarters in Washington and the ninth largest banking organiza-
tion in the state. At the end of 1971, it had total deposits of $95.6
million and loans of $57.6 million. WTB has seven branch offices,
six of which are in Spokane while the other branch is in a Spokane
suburb. Thus it controls 17.5 .percent of the 46 commercial banking
offices in the Spokane Metropolitan area. 29
WTB is well-managed and profitable. 3 ° In the years preceding
25 Marine, 418 U.S. at 622; Connecticut Bank, 418 U.S. at 667.
2° Marine, 418 U.S. at 638-39.
27 Id. at 639. See discussion in text at note 128 infra.
2° 418 U.S. at 606-07.
29 Id. at 607.
3° Id.
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the proposed acquisition of WTB by NBC, WTB's percentage of the
total deposits held by banking organizations in the Spokane Met-
ropolitan area increased. During the five years preceding the chal-
lenged merger, WTB's deposits increased approximately 50 percent
and its loans 70 percent, a higher rate of increase than that exhibited
by other banking organizations operating in Spokane. 3 '
The bulk of the banking business in Washington is done by a
few banking organizations. While there were 91 national and state
banks in Washington as of June 30, 1972, the two largest banks in
the state, Seattle First National Bank and NBC, accounted for 51.3
percent of total deposits and 36.5 percent of the banking offices in
Washington. Likewise, the five largest banks in the state held 74.3
percent of the state's total commercial bank deposits and operated
61.3 percent of its banking offices, 32
Not surprisingly, concentration in the banking market within
the Spokane Metropolitan area is even more intense. The largest
banking organization in Spokane, Washington Bancshares, Inc.,
which controls two separate banks and their respective branches,
accounted for 42.1 percent of the total deposits in the Spokane
Metropolitan area, as of midyear 1972. Seattle First National Bank
held 31.6 percent and WTB held 18.6 percent of deposits at that
time. The combined total of the other three commercial banks in
Spokane accounted for 8 percent of deposits. 33 Distribution of de-
posits held by commercial banks in Spokane for the period, 1966-
1972, is as follows: 34
Banking Organization
12-31-66
(dollars in thousands)
6-30-72
$
% of
Total $
% of
Total
Washington Bancshares,
Inc. 155,885 41.1 216,340 42.1
Seattle-First National
Bank 145,251 38.3 162,220 31.6
W- ashington Trust Bank 63,102 16.6 95,464 18.6
Sub Total 364,238 96.1 474,024 92.3
American Commercial
Bank 3,552 .9 15,789 3.1
Farmers and Merchants
Bank 5,593 1.5 12,558 2.5
Pacific National Bank 5,801 1.5 11,152 2.2
Total 379,184 100.0	 • 513,473 100.0
Note: Due to rounding, figures may not add to totals.
31 Id .
32 Id. at 608-09.
33 Id. at 609.
34 Id. at 607-08 n.2.
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As the Court observed, "[t]he degree of concentration of the
commercial banking business in Spokane may well reflect the sever-
ity of Washington's statutory restraints on de novo geographic ex-
pansion by. banks." 35 Under Washington law banks are restricted to
opening branches in three geographic areas: (1) the city in which
their headquarters is located; (2) 'the unincorporated areas in the
county in which their headquarters is located; and (3) the incorpo-
rated communities which have no banking office. 36 Although banks
are generally permitted to branch into other areas only by acquisi-
tion of an existing bank or banking office, de novo entry into areas
normally foreclosed to existing banks has been accomplished by
sponsorship of a "friendly" independent bank which is then acquired
by the sponsoring bank. 37 Under the sponsored bank procedure, the
sponsored bank must first be chartered as an independent bank and
operated for a period of time as an independent institution. Al-
though a state chartered bank may not agree to be acquired for ten
years after it is chartered, except with the consent of the supervisor
of banking, 38 no such ten year provision applies in the case of
sponsored national banks, which are chartered under federal law. 39
In Spokane two of the six banking institutions would be barred from
opening additional branches. 4° Of the three banking institutions capa-
ble of opening aditional branches in Spokane, two accounted for a
modest portion of the banking business with 3.1 percent and 2.5
percent of deposits respectively, and one of them had no offices in the
city of Spokane.'"
.B. The Connecticut National-First New Haven Merger
Connecticut National, with headquarters in the Bridgeport
metropolitan area, is the fourth largest commercial bank in Connec-
ticut. 42 At the end of 1972, it accounted for 6.2 percent of deposits
in commercial banks in Connecticut and 40 percent of the deposits
in the Bridgeport metropolitan area. Connecticut National operates
51 offices in Bridgeport and nearby towns.'" Moreover, Connecticut
35 Id. at 609.
36 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 30.40,020 (1974). One implication of this provision, which is
important to the Court's analysis in Marine, is that "once a bank acquires or takes over one of
the banks operating in a city or town other than the acquiring bank's principal place of
business, it cannot branch from the acquired bank." 418 U.S. at 611.
37 418 U.S. at 634.
31 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 30.08.020(7) (1974).
39
 Brief for Appellant at 48, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant, Marine].
4° Seattle-First National Bank and Pacific National Bank of Washington have headquar-
ters in Seattle. 418 U.S. at 607 n.2.
41 Id. at 609.
42 Connecticut Bank, 418 U.S. at 658.
4' Id.
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National has experienced significant growth, having acquired four
banks prior to the merger and having established thirty-four
branches de novo between 1955 and 1971. 44 However, it has no
offices in New Haven. 45
First New Haven is headquartered in New Haven and is the
eighth largest bank in Connecticut." It accounted for 4.1 percent of
deposits in commercial banks in Connecticut and 39.5 percent de-
posits in commercial banks in the New Haven metropolitan area.
Seventeen of its twenty two offices are located in the New Haven
metropolitan area. 47
 Prior to the merger First New Haven had
expanded greatly, by acquiring three banks and had established
fourteen branches de novo between 1955 and 1971. 48
Commercial banking in the state of Connecticut is highly con-
centrated. The five largest banks accounted for 61 percent of de-
posits in the state at the end of 1971 and the ten largest banks
accounted for 83 percent. 49
 The level of concentration is attribut-
able, to some extent, to a relatively recent elimination of many
banks by acquisition. The number of banks in Connecticut declined
from 105 in 1955 to 63 banks in 1971. 5° According to the Justice
Department, "most of these acquisitions were made by larger
banks," and until recently, "all but three of the acquisitions between
1955 and 1966 were of small banks."51
Connecticut banking law reinforces this market concentration.
It prohibits banks not headquartered in Connecticut from operating
banking offices within the state. 52 Moreover, it allows banks to
establish a branch de novo only in a town where another bank does
not already have its headquarters. 53 Thus, while banks are permit-
ted to branch statewide, their ability to do so is curtailed by this
"home-office-protection" statute. Of course, larger cities, such as
Bridgeport and New Haven, have long been closed to branching by
44
 Brief for Appellant at 11-12, United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S.
656 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant, Connecticut Bank].
45
 Id. at 12. The service areas of the two banks overlapped in a "four-town area"
between Bridgeport and New Haven. The district court approved a divestiture plan under
which the banks committed themselves to divestiture of a sufficient number of offices in the
four-town area to cure the overlap. The Department of Justice did not pursue this point on
appeal. 418 U.S. at 659.
46
 418 U.S. at 659.
47 Brief for Appellant, Connecticut Bank, supra note 44, at . 11.
4° Id. at 12.
49 418 U.S. at 658. The two largest banks account for 41% of the total commercial bank
deposits held by Connecticut banks. Id.
s° Brief for Appellant, Connecticut Bank, supra note 44, at 5.
St Id .
52 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-59(4) (1974).
" Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-59(1) (1974).
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outside banks, although many of their suburbs are open to branch-
ing because of the absence of bank headquarters in these areas. 54
In light of this factual background, the Court's treatment of the
issues presented by Marine and Connecticut National can properly
be evaluated. Attention will initially focus upon the majority's
definition of "section of the country," or the relevant geographic
area in which the effect upon competition is analyzed under section
7 of the Clayton Act. This discussion will be followed by an exami-
nation of the judicial application of the potential competition theory,
with particular emphasis placed upon the Court's application of this
doctrine in Marine and Connecticut National.
III. CLAYTON ACT SECTION 7: THE RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC
AREA IN BANK MERGER CASES
The statutory language of section 7 demands judicial definition
of the relevant geographic area that will be affected by a merger,"
since only mergers substantially lessening competition in a defined
geographic area are prohibited. 56 In Connecticut National and
Marine, the Justice Department argued for a change in the prior
judicial definition of the relevant geographic area in bank merger
cases." In earlier cases the government had successfully contended
that the geographic areas in which adverse competitive effects
would be felt were the specific local markets in which the acquired
firms were active competitiors and with respect to which the acquir-
ing firms were potential competitors." Although conceding that the
state and particular regions were too large to qualify as markets
within which most customers could conveniently turn for banking
services, the Department of Justice, in Marine and Connecticut
National, argued the propriety of measuring the probable competi-
tive effects of an acquisition in terms of both local markets and
broader geographic areas where the acquisition will have impact."
One of the reasons for the introduction of regional and statewide
considerations may have been a pragmatic determination to define
the relevant market in a broader geographic context because of the
54 Brief for Appellant, Connecticut Bank, supra note 44, at 8.
55
 For the text of § 7 of the Clayton Act, see note 10 supra.
" Marine, 418 U.S. at 618.
57 Brief for Appellant, Marine, supra note 39, at 33-34; Brief for Appellant, Connecticut
Bank, supra note 44, at 31-34.
58 E.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 527 (1973); United States
v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 447 (1964).
59 Marine, 418 U.S. at 619-20; see Connecticut Bank, 418 U.S. at 666-67. Brief for
Appellant, Marine, supra note 39, at 33-34; Brief for Appellant, Connecticut Bank, supra
note 44, at 31-34.
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failure of the narrowly focused approach utilized by the Justice
Department in earlier cases. 6° A more basic reason for this depar-
ture undoubtedly was the Department's concern with the structure
of the evolving banking market in certain states and the possible
effects which this statewide phenomenon might have upon local
markets. 61
The regional or statewide effects anticipated by the government
were the following: (1) elimination of the acquired bank as a poten-
tial entrant into other local markets; (2) successive acquisitions of
substantial market positions in most of the state's local markets
resulting in a network of interlinked local oligopolies; and (3) elimi-
nation of strong independent banks able to resist any linked
oligopolies. 62 In Connecticut National the government also argued
that where the number of banks capable of operating statewide is
very limited, the elimination of one of them by acquisition "will
have an impact in every local market" where the acquired bank
does not, but otherwise might have, operated. 63
The Court rejected the government's expansive interpretation
of "section of the country" on two grounds." First, in prior section 7
cases the Court consistently equated "section of the country" and
"relevant geographic market." 65
 The latter term has traditionally
been defined as the area in which the goods or services are marketed
by the acquired firm. 66 Thus, while there may be several relevant
60 See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text. See also, Baker, Potential Competition in
Banking: After Greeley, What?, 90 Banking L.J. 362 (1973).
61
 ['The Government asserts that the State is an economically differentiated region,
because its boundaries delineate an area within which Washington banks are insu-
lated from most forms of competition by out-of-state banking organizations. The
Government further argues that this merger, and others it will allegedly trigger, may
lead eventually to the domination of all banking in the State by a few large banks,
facing each other in a network of local, oligopolistic banking markets. This assumed
eventual statewide linkage of local markets, it is argued, will enhance statewide the
possibility of parallel, standardized, anticompetitive behavior.
Marine, 418 U.S. at 620. See Baker, State Branch Bank Barriers and Future Shock—Will the
Walls Come Tumbling Down?, 91 Banking L.J. 119 (1974); Solomon, Bank Merger Policy
and Problems: A Linkage Theory of Oligopoly, 89 Banking L.J. 116 (1972).
62
 Marine, 418 U.S. at 620; Brief for Appellant, Marine, supra note 39, at 34-35.
63
 Brief for Appellant, Connecticut Bank, supra note 44, at 33.
" Marine, 418 U.S. at 620-23; Connecticut Bank, 418 U.S. at 666-69.
65 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat? Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). The
prior potential competition cases have assumed identity between "section of the country" and
"relevant geographic market." E.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526,
527 (1973); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 447 (1964).
" E.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357-62 (1963). Presum-
ably, the Court would concede that its identification of the market with the area where the
"acquired" company competes would be inappropriate where the outsider company, the
potential entrant, is acquired by a company operating in the market which the outsider might
have invaded. In such a case potential competition in the acquiring company's market may be
lessened. The Court acknowledged that in the case of a joint venture into a new area, the
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geographic markets, including local, regional and national markets,
each must be shown to be an "area in which the acquired firm is an
actual, direct competitor." 67 The second basis for rejecting the De-
partment's position was that the factual foundation of its argument
was "too speculative on this record. " 6 B It should be recognized that
the Court, in Marine, stated that rejection of the statewide or
regional concept is limited to the facts of that case." However, the
language on this point in the Court's Connecticut National opinion
is not so clearly confined. 70
The "section of the country" issue raised by Marine and Con-
necticut National may prove to be of import only in market-
extension cases in the banking industry. In the past, the relevant
markets for evaluating market-extension mergers have been the
markets in which the acquired company is an active competitor. 71
In contrast, regulatory barriers to entry and to branching in the
banking industry may have peculiar significance for competition in
markets in which neither party to the merger is a direct competitor.
Obviously, proof of the effects of such an acquisition in areas where
neither company competes is even more difficult than proof relating
to the acquired company's markets. Still, however limited the op-
portunities for proving broader effects on competition may be, there
is no good reason to foreclose attempts to prove such effects. To
leave open the possibility for such proof is to give effect to the
section 7 ban against acquisitions which substantially lessen compe-
tition in "any section of the country."
relevant market is the area in which the new corporation will market its goods. Marine, 418
U.S. at 621 n.19.
67 Marine, 418 U.S. at 622. In Connecticut Bank, the Court rejected the state as a
section of the country because "the two banks do not operate statewide, nor do their
customers as a general rule utilize commercial banks on that basis." 418 U.S. at 667. Instead,
"Mite relevant geographic market of the acquired bank is a.localized area in which that bank
is in significant, direct competition with other banks, albeit not the acquiring bank." Id.
The Court also affirmed the district court's holding that the government cannot rely solely
upon Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's) to define the geographic markets of
the two banks because SMSA's "are not sufficiently refined in terms of realistic commercial
banking markets to satisfy the government's burden. Id. at 670. The Court suggested that a
more useful concept might be the "service area concept," which defines the geographic area
from which a bank derives 75 percent of its deposits and which is used by federal bank
regulatory agencies. Id. n.9.
66 Marine, 418 U.S. at 622. The Court asserted: "To assume on the basis of essentially
no evidence that the challenged merger would tend to produce a statewide linkage of
oligopolies is to espouse a per se rule against geographic market extension mergers like the one
at issue here." Id. at 622-23 (emphasis added).
69 Id. at 623.
7° Thus, the Court stated, "[T]he relevant geographic market of the acquired bank is the
localized area in which that bank is in significant, direct competition with other banks, albeit
not the acquiring bank. This area must be defined in accordance with this Court's precedents
in prior bank merger cases." 418 U.S. at 667.
71 See notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
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As a result of the Marine decision, the Justice Department in
future market-extension bank cases will have to assume the burden
of much more elaborate proof to demonstrate the effects of a chal-
lenged acquisition in various local markets of the state or region.
However, because of the regulatory barriers to entry and to expan-
sion in the banking industry, proof relating to effects beyond the
acquired bank's market may be more feasible than in other indus-
tries. Through its systematic review of bank merger applications 72
the Justice Department is presumably accumulating a body of in-
formation relating to the evolving structure of banking in various
states. Conceivably, this information can be marshalled to permit
inferences concerning the competitive potential of the merging
banks within their state. In certain instances, there is experience
both concerning the consequences of forbidding potential entrants to
make acquisitions and concerning the ability of medium-sized banks
to expand geographically. 73
IV. LIMITATIONS UPON THE APPLICATION OF THE
POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE
The proscription of section 7 74 has been used to attack those
acquisitions of direct competitors, 75 suppliers, 76 and customers77
which, with reasonable probability, will substantially lessen compe-
tition in any line of commerce in any section of the country. 78 A
section 7 theory of relatively recent vintage challenges mergers on
the basis that the acquisition of the target firm will tend to eliminate
potential competition in the relevant market. 79 A review of the
developing case law indicates that the existence of certain factors are
prerequisites to application of this potential competition doctrine.
72 For a description of the Department's procedures in this field, see Banking and the
Justice Department: The Whys' and the `Hows', address by Joe Sims, Special Assistant to the
Assistant Attorney General, Advanced Conference on Bank Holding Company Management
Problems, Dallas, Texas, June 2, 1974 (copy on file at the offices of the Boston College
Industrial & Commercial Law Review).
73 See Baker, Potential Competition in Banking: After Greely: What?, 90 Banking L.J.
362 (1973).
74 For the text of 7 of the Clayton Act, see note 10 supra.
75 See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1966); United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 377 U.S. 271, 280-81 (1964) (Rome Cable).
76
 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 566-71 (1972).
77 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718, 729-30 (E.D.
Mo. 1964) (Cupples); United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 101-05
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd 381 U.S. 414 (1965).
78 "Congress used the words 'may be substantially to lessen competition' (emphasis
supplied), to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties." Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, .323 (1962).
'9 For an examination of the basis and development of the doctrine, see note 9 supra.
716
BANK MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT
Most obvious, of course, is the requirement that one of the merging
firms was previously outside of the relevant market, 8 ° Furthermore,
the acquiring firm must have alternate means for entry into the
market, either as a de novo entrant or by a "toehold acquisition" of
a small competitor." In addition, the target market must be in-
sufficiently competitive and also ordinarily must be concentrated. 82
As the Court observed in Marine:
The potential-competition doctrine has meaning only as
applied to concentrated markets. That is, the doctrine
comes into play only where there are dominant partici-
pants in the target market engaging in interdependent or
parallel behavior and with the capacity, effectively to de-
termine price and total output of goods or services. If the
target market performs as a competitive market in tradi-
tional antitrust terms, the participants in the market will
have no occasion to fashion their behavior to take into
account the presence of a potential entrant. The present
procompetitive effects that a perceived potential entrant
may produce in an oligopolistic market will already have
been accomplished if the target market is performing com-
petitively. Likewise, there would be no need for concern
about the prospects of long-term deconcentration of a mar-
ket which is in fact genuinely competitive. 83
In order to understand properly the restrictions imposed upon the
potential competition doctrine by Marine and Connecticut National,
the elements and the rationale of the doctrine must be analyzed.
Some of the market extension cases have involved minimal competitive , overlap; this
has not prevented the courts from analyzing these cases in terms of potential competition. See,
e.g., Connecticut Bank, 418 U.S. at 662; Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 506-07 (2d
Cir. 1972). Moreover, even though the outsider has always been the acquiring company, there
is no conceptual problem with applying the same standards to the situation where the
potential competitor is acquired by a competitor operating in the market.
°' While the earlier potential competition cases focused solely upon the possibility of de
novo entry, recent opinions have discussed the possibility of toehold acquisitions with appar-
ent approval of the concept. In United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973),
the Court treated possible toehold acquisitions as the equivalent of de novo entry. Id. at 530
n.10. Moreover, in Marine, while the Court ultimately rejected the government's argument
that NBC had available to it possible toehold acquisitions, it nowhere suggested that toehold
acquisitions are not valid considerations in a potential competition analysis. See 418 U.S. at
637-39.
12
 Not all potential competition cases won by the government have involved highly
concentrated markets. Recently, one such merger was enjoined because the market although
perhaps not concentrated at the time of trial, was headed in that direction. Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 78 (10th Cir. 1972). See also Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309
F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir, 1962).
13 418 U.S. at 630-31.
717
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
A. Perceived Potential Entrant
The elimination of a potential entrant may produce any of
several anticompetitive influences within the target market." These
adverse effects can be categorized in three groups. The initial and
broadest branch of the doctrine has focused upon the preservation of
the procompetitive effect of an outsider who is perceived by existing
competitors as a likely entrant if market conditions become attrac-
tive. 85
 This "perceived potential entrant," existing on the periphery
of the market, is likely to have a beneficial influence upon competition
comparable to that of a firm already competing within the market. 86
Thus, in order to prevent the market from appearing attractive to an
outsider, existing firms are more likely to temper oligopolistic tenden-
cies87
 and, consequently, to alter pricing decisions. 88
B. Raising Barriers to Entry
The second branch of the potential competition doctrine focuses
upon whether an acquisition has the effect of raising the entry
barriers to a particular market. Not all concentrated industries are
populated by large conglomerates. Hence, the acquisition of a lead-
ing firm in a concentrated industry by a firm with resources far
greater than those held by existing competitors may presage sub-
stantial changes in the intensity of competition and scale of opera-
tions within that industry. For instance, in FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co.," the Court was particularly concerned that Procter's
acquisition of Clorox would raise barriers to entry into the house-
hold bleach market because of Procter's advertising advantages."
34
 For a description of the different anticompetitive influences that the potential competi-
tion doctrine is designed to prevent, see United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S.
526, 558-562 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1362 (1965).
35 See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173-74 (1964).
86 United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-32 (1973). Falstaff also
makes clear that an acquiring company may be a perceived potential competitor despite a
finding that the acquiring company, as a matter of fact, would never have entered the market.
Id. Other cases which have acknowledged and applied the "wings-effect" theory include FTC
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967); Missouri Portland Cement v. Cargill,
Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 861 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 76 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974); General Foods
Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 946 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); United
States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 559-63 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
87 See Marine, 418 U.S. at 625.
18 See Robinson, Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 163, 186 (1974).
386 U.S. 568 (1967).
" "Procter's budget was much larger [than Clorox's); and, although it would not devote
its entire budget to advertising Clorox, it could divert a large portion to meet the short-term
threat of a new entrant. Procter would be able to use its volume discounts to advantage in
advertising Clorox. Thus, a new entrant would be much more reluctant to face the giant
Procter than it would have been to face the smaller Clorox." Id. at 579.
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This consideration, coupled with other anticompetitive effects of the
proposed merger, formed the basis for the Court's conclusion that
Procter's acquisition of Clorox was violative of section 7. 9 '
Likewise, in General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 92 General Foods' acquisi-
tion of S.O.S. was found to have "raised to virtually insurmountable
heights entry barriers which were already high." 93 This finding was
based on the fact that steel soap pads were "easily integrated into
the marketing program employed by [General Foods] for its pack-
aged food products" 94 and General Foods "was able to advertise and
promote S.O.S. less expensively than the pre-merger S.O.S. Com-
pany . ."95
An interesting variation of the same'theory may be detected in
the analysis of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC , 96 which involved Ken-
necott's acquisition of Peabody Coal. In this case the court found
that conditions in the coal industry were raising market entry bar-
riers: "The evidence is clear that the coal industry had become so
complex and specialized even before the instant merger that it was
virtually impossible for a company with fewer resources than Ken-,
necott to start a coal company by the acquisition of reserves and
equipment."97 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the acquisi-
tion raised entry barriers further by removing a potential entrant. 98
Unfortunately, the court of appeals did not analyze the effect of the
removal of a potential entrant upon entry barriers. Kennecott was
clearly not a case in which, like Procter and General Foods, the
acquiring company conferred upon the acquired company advan-
tages that other potential entrants would have to assess.9 9 A possible
explanation for the court's conclusion could be its finding that Ken-
necott was "the most likely entrant into the coal business. " 1 ° 0 It may
91 Id. at 578-81.
92 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967).
93
 Id. at 945.
94
 Id. at 944.
95
 Id. at 945. Wilson Sporting Goods' acquisition of the leading manufacturer of gymnas-
tic equipment raised barriers, in part, because of the marketing advantage to the acquired
product line because of affiliation with the Wilson dealers. United States v. Wilson Sporting
Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 559 (N.D. Ill. 1968). Moreover, the district court found that,
while the Wilson acquisition would not deter entry by large sporting goods companies, small
companies could be deterred from entry and small competitors operating in that market would
seek mergers with larger companies. Id. at 558.
98 467 F.2(1 . 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S, 909 (1974).
99
 467 F.2d at 77.
98 Id. at 77-78..
" There is language in the court's opinion concerning Kennecott's "deep pocket." Id. at
78. However, the coal industry already had many competitors with equally deep pockets. Id.
at 72-73.
0° Id. at 77.
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have reasoned that since the level at which the most likely entrant is
willing to enter is lower than for other possible entrants, the elimi-
nation of the most likely entrant decreases the likelihood of de novo
entry. 1 ° 1
Closely akin to the raising-barriers branch of the potential
competition doctrine is the theory that an acquisition may substan-
tially lessen competition by entrenching the acquired company in its
market position. One of the anticompetitive effects of Procter &
Gamble's acquisition of Clorox was that "the smaller firms would
become more cautious due to their fear of retaliation by Procter. " 102
Likewise, General Food's acquisition of S.O.S. had a "depressing
effect upon the quality of competition in the market" because of "the
power to take retaliatory action against any aggressive competition
by smaller competitors."'" In many situations the entrenchment
effect can be characterized as merely another aspect of the merger's
effects upon barriers.
C. Actual Potential Entrant
A third branch of the potential competition doctrine involves an
actual potential entrant, which is a party that, without reference to
the perceptions of competitors in the market, would likely have
entered the market, apart from the challenged acquisiton, either de
novo or by acquisition of a small competitor.'" The injury to
competition allegedly resulting from the elimination of such an
entrant through merger is the loss of the prospect of that company's
probable entry with the concomitant long-term deconcentration of
an oligopolistic market.'"
I°' See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967): "The first [anticompetitive
effect) is simply that loss of the most likely entrant increases the operative barriers by
decreasing the likelihood that any firm will attempt to surmount them." Id. at 585-86 (Harlan,
J., concurring). Justice Harlan added:
Bain's pioneering study of barriers to entry, Barriers to New Competition,
recognized that such barriers could be surmounted at different price levels by
different potential entrants. Thus even without change in the nature of the barriers
themselves, the market could become more insulated through loss of the most likely
entrant simply because the prevailing market price would have to rise to a higher
level than before to induce entry.
Id. at 586 n.4 (Harlan, J., concurring).
1°2 Id. at 578.
1°3 General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 946 (3d Cir. 1967). See also United
States v, Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 556 (N.D. III. 1968).
1°4 See Marine; 418 U.S. at 625. The term "actual potential entrant" was first used by
Justice Marshall in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526, 560 (1973) (concur-
ring opinion). Professor Turner has referred to such a company as a "probable entrant."
Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section Seven of the Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313,
1384 (1965). Another phrase that has been used to describe an actual potential entrant is a
"reasonably probable entrant:" FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 586 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
1 ° 5  Marine, 418 U.S. at 633..
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While the Court has never formally conferred its approval upon
the actual potential entrant concept, this theory was implicitly rec-
ognized in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. 106 and, particu-
larly, in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. 107 The district court's error
in Penn-Olin was in its failure to determine "the probability that one
[venturer] would have built 'while the other continued to pon-
der.' " 108 Penn-Olin was remanded for a finding as to whether one
of the joint venturers would have entered the market alone and
whether the other would have remained an influence on the fringe of
the market. 1 °9 Affirmative findings as to these questions would
mean that the first company would have been an actual potential
entrant and the second company would have been a perceived
potential entrant. In Procter & Gamble one of the Court's determi-
nations, based upon Procter's product lines, its diversification pro-
gram, its experience in handling products like bleach and its interest
in bleach, was that "Procter was the most likely entrant" into the
household bleach industry. "° However, the Court did not apply the
actual potential entrant theory in concluding that Procter's acquisi-
tion of Clorox violated section 7. The finding that Procter was the
most likely entrant into the market was viewed as one of several
factors which demonstrated that the existence of Procter on the
periphery of the industry influenced competitive practices within the
market."'
Despite having alluded to the actual potential entrant concept
in Penn-Olin and Procter & Gamble, the Court in United States v.
106 378 U.S. 158, 177 (1964).
107 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967),
109 378 U.S. at 173.
1 °9 Id. at 177.
11 ° 386 U.S. at 580. In his concurring opinion in United States v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp„ 410 U.S. 526 (1973), Mr. Justice Marshall finds support for this concept in the Court's
analysis of Continental Can's acquisition of Hazel-Atlas as an attempt by Continental to
"insulate itself from competition by acquiring a major firm not presently directing its market
acquisition efforts toward the same end uses as Continental, but possessing the potential to do
so." Id, at 562, citing United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 464 (1964). This
theory has also been employed in the lower courts. In affirming the F.T.C.'s determination
that Kennecott's acquisition of Peabody Coal violated § 7 because Kennecott was one of a few
likely entrants, the Tenth Circuit stated:
Based on the evidence that Kennecott was peculiarly well qualified because of its
long experience in hard rock mining and its acknowledged capabilities, its financial
resources and its close proximity to the coal industry, it was found that Kennecott
was not only a likely entrant but also the most likely entrant into the coal business.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 77 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909
(1974). Likewise, in Wilson Sporting Goods, the district court carefully scrutinized the
evidence under this theory to determine whether "Wilson would enter via internal expansion
if this merger were prohibited." United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp.
543, 561 (N. D. Ill. 1968).
"' 386 U.S. at 581.
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Falstaff Brewing Corp. 112
 expressly reserved the question of whether
section 7 applies to a merger involving an actual potential en-
trant.' 13
 The Department of Justice, perhaps with the objective of
testing the viability of this theory, presented the actual potential
doctrine as its principal argument in Marine ." 4 Arguing that the
NBC-WBT merger would deprive the market of NBC's probable
future entry into the market, 15 the Department offered evidence
that NBC was one of only two institutions capable of entering
Spokane with substantial competitive impact, and that NBC's his-
tory of geographic expansion demonstrated its interest in entering
the Spokane market. 18 On the basis of this evidence, the govern-
ment submitted that NBC would have entered the market either by
sponsorship and subsequent acquisition of a new bank in Spokane,
or by toehold acquisition. 117
The Court, prior to assessing the factual support for the gov-
ernment's contention, stated that two preconditions must exist be-
fore determining whether the actual potential entrant theory is a
basis for invalidation of the merger under section 7." 8 First, a
feasible alternate means for entering the market must be avail-
able. " 9 This requirement is considered satisfied only if the alternate
means include the prospect of obtaining a substantial position in the
market.'" Secondly, there must be a substantial likelihood that
entry into the market by the alternate means would produce "decon-
centration of the market or other significant competitive effects." 12 I
In essence, the inquiry required by this condition is an analysis of
the number of branches that NBC would obtain under various
means of entry.
Applying these criteria to an evaluation of the sponsorship
device, the Court rejected the assertion that such a means of entry
would produce any significant procompetitive benefits in the
Spokane banking market.' 22
 Despite assuming arguendo that spon-
112. 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
113 Id. at 537.
114 418 U.S. at 623-33. See Brief for Appellant at 36-53, United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant, Marine].
115 418 U.S. at 633.
"6 See Brief for Appellant, Marine, supra note 114, at 43.
117 418 U.S. at 633.
"I Id.
119 Id .
12 ° Id. at 635-37.
121
 Id. at 633. The Court's formulation includes the words "or other procompetitive
effects," but the Court's subsequent analysis never reflects consequences other than the
possibility of the potential entrant obtaining a substantial market share. See id. at 636.
122 Id. at 636-37.
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sorship and subsequent acquisition of a new bank in Spokane would
be feasible for NBC,' 23 the majority concluded:
State law would not allow NBC to branch from a spon-
sored bank after it was acquired. NBC's entry into
Spokane therefore would be frozen at the level of its initial
acquisition. Thus, if NBC were to enter Spokane by spon-
soring and acquiring a small bank, it would be trapped
into the position of operating a single branch office in a
large metropolitan area with no reasonable likelihood of
developing a significant share of that market. This as-
sumed method of entry therefore would offer little realistic
hope of ultimately producing deconcentration in the
Spokane market.'"
On the basis of the same reasoning, the Court denied that
NBC's acquisition of one of the smaller banks would have produced
procompetitive effects. 125 The state statutory ban on further branch-
ing after acquistion and entry' 26 into the Spokane market cast doubt
upon the government's theory that the smaller banks were realistic
vehicles for entry into this market.'" The majority noted that of the
two "toehold" banks, one had an office in a suburb, which, after
acquisition by NBC, would have been prohibited under state law
from opening branches in Spokane. 128 The second bank could not
have been lawfully acquired until four years after the challenged
acquisition because it was chartered in 1965 and could not, under
state law, be acquired until 1975. 1 " However, even if one of these
banks became an available merger partner in the foreseeable future,
lilt again does not follow that an acquisition of either
would produce the long-term market-structure benefits
predicted by the, Government. Once NBC acquired either
123 Id. at 636.
124 Id. In any event, the sponsorship method suggested by the Justice Department must
be used with caution. The use of this method does not guarantee that the Justice Department
will not later challenge acquisition of the sponsored bank or will not attack arrangements
between the sponsoring and sponsored hanks as restraints of trade. United States v. Citizens
& S. Nat'l Bank, 372 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Ga. 1974), which was argued on March 19, 1975
before the Supreme Court, 43 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. March 25, 1975), involves an attempt by
C & S to acquire banks which it had sponsored in adjacent counties while Georgia law
forbade it to branch into those counties. The government not only challenged the acquisition
under Clayton Act § 7, but also attacked the earlier arrangements between C & S Bank and
the sponsored banks as constituting illegal combinations. 372 F. Supp. at 620.
123 Id. at 638.
124 See text at note 124 supra.
129 418 U.S. at 638.
12$ Id.
129 Id.
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of these banks, it could not branch from the acquired
bank. This limitation strongly suggests that NBC would
not develop into a significant participant in the Spokane
market, a prospect, that finds support in the record."°
Since the Department of Justice failed to convince the Court
that there existed feasible alternate methods of entry and that those
methods would produce long-term deconcentration of the market,
the actual potential entrant theory was not accepted as a viable
challenge to the NBC-WBT merger."' Most importantly, because
the government failed to satisfy the preconditions to application of
this theory, the Court once again reserved resolution of the validity
of a challenge to a merger under section 7 based on the theory that
the acquiring firm is an actual potential entrant.' 32
When considered in light of the Court's exhaustive treatment of
the evidence and the employment of the actual potential entrant
concept in the past, 133 the refusal to squarely address the viability of
this theory is curious. The fact that, in most cases, a likely entrant
will probably also be a perceived potential entrant is not reason for
discarding the concept of an actual potential entrant. A useful
purpose is fulfilled by recognizing the independent importance of the
actual potential entrant theory. It should be recognized that the
problems of proof in demonstrating a violation of section 7 under
the respective theories are different. 134
 Furthermore, assuming that
a particular acquiring company cannot be shown to exercise a
present influence from the fringe of the market but can be proven to
be one of the few companies likely to enter a concentrated market de
novo, there seems to be ample reason to preclude its entry by
acquisition. An assessment of the evidence after an acquisition has
been announced may reveal that the acquiring company is the most
likely entrant into the market. However, short-term conditions in
the market may temporarily destroy the influence of that company
on the fringe of the market, or the potential entrant may not be
perceived as such. In such situations, directing the actual potential
entrant from acquisition to de novo entry would serve the purposes
of section 7 well. The public policy embodied in section 7, which
justifies a stringent rule against horizontal mergers in a concentrated
market, also justifies preservation of the prospect of deconcentration
of concentrated markets. Obviously, where the prospects for decon-
130 Id.
' 3 ' Id. at 639.
I n Id.
133 See notes 106-11 supra and accompanying text.
134 See United States v. Falitaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 533-36, 563-70 (1973).
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centration of a concentrated market are numerous, that policy is
little served by stopping a market-extension acquisition. However,
in the case of highly concentrated markets, horizontal mergers in-
volving small market shares have been halted. 135 In light of these
decisions, it is a logical step—where the market is highly
concentrated—to bar acquisition into the market by the company
most likely otherwise to enter de novo. Section 7 must either be
found capable of preserving the prospect for deconcentration or it
must be relegated to a rear-guard action of preventing existing
concentration from becoming intensified. 176
Moreover, it appears that the objectives of section 7 will be
frustrated if courts accept the suggestion that the elimination of a
potential entrant is not competitively significant unless there are
alternate means of entry which provide the prospect of substantial
deconcentration of the market.'" The size of the market share
acquired by a potential entrant is not necessarily indicative of the
impact that the acquisition will have on the market. Small com-
petitors can be innovative; they can also be disruptive. Moreover, in
view of the influence on concentrated markets credited to the exis-
tence of perceived potential entrants, the likelihood of entry even on
a small scale should not be dismissed lightly. If an oligopolistic
industry is sensitive to the possibility of entry, the existing com-
petitors will also be sensitive to the competition of a new entrant,
even if its market share is modest.
To the extent that Marine discounts the significance of acquisi-
tions without the prospect of substantial deconcentration, the deci-
sion is inconsistent with the concern permeating the Court's horizon-
tal merger decisions. The Court has fashioned standards which say,
in effect, that in a highly concentrated market acquisition of a small
competitor by another small competitor is of concern.'" In such a
context the small competitor is not competitively significant. Thus,
in section 7 cases, the Court should not require the party challenging
the acquisition to show that the acquiring company's alternate
means of entry entailed a present prospect of substantial deconcen-
tration. Rather, an acquisition of a company with a substantial
134 See, e.g., United States v, Pabst Brewing Co., 3M U.S. 546 (1966); United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).; United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963).
13° It can also be argued that, if competition in a market is so defective that it can be
significantly influenced by a perceived potential entrant, the need to preserve the prospect of
future entry and, thus, deconcentration is strong.
137 Earlier potential competition cases which involved an actual potential entrant are not
instructive on this point, perhaps because of the application in those cases of other potential
competition theories as well. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1968).
138 See cases cited at note 135 supra.
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market position by an actual potential entrant should not be allowed
where de novo or toehold entry, presenting the possibility of market
deconcentration in the future, is feasible.
Although in the case of acquisition by an actual potential en-
trant the loss stemming from the acquisition is not as direct as in the
case of a horizontal merger, the market's need for more competition
may be gr6at---even in the form of a small competitor. For instance,
even if it were true that NBC would have remained a small com-
petitor 139
 in Spokane if means of entry had been limited to a toehold
acquisition or a sponsorship-acquisition, it does not follow that
nothing was lost by permitting NBC to assume the place of one of
the three large banks. Deconcentration would not, in any case,
occur overnight, but if it did occur, a good start would have been to
require the most likely entrant to enter in a way that gives it a
foothold rather than immediate control of a large -market position. If
the bank most likely to enter de novo cannot be expected to do so,
one wonders what company would be such an entrant. Under the
Court's rationale the only realistic basis for entry is acquisition of a
competitor which has several branches. Once all such competitors
are acquired, as in Spokane, the Court apparently believes that no
further entry should be expected. Unfortunately, the Court's ap-
proach provides potential entrants with a rationale for rejecting
acquisitions of small competitors and a justification for acquiring
companies with substantial market positions, particularly where
state branch banking restrictions in effect eliminate the potential for
substantial market deconcentration resulting from the acquisition of
a small bank by a large acquiring bank.
139 Even accepting the conceptual validity of the Court's approach, it is far from clear
that the three smaller banks in Spokane would not have served as viable toehold acquisitions
for NBC's entry into Spokane. In the years preceding the NBC-WTB acquisition, these banks
prospered, growing faster than the three large banks. The three small banks in Spokane
experienced a growth in deposits from 1966 to 1971 from $14,946,000 to $39,449,000 and their
combined market share increased from 3.9% to 7.8% of the market. See text at note 34 supra.
Moreover, there is little reason to accept the Court's identification of NBC's control over a
certain number of branch offices as correlative , with its competitive capacity. While branching
is a competitive device, there is no necessary correlation between number of branches and a
bank's influence in the market. Evidence from other metropolitan banking markets in
Washington refutes the assumption that a bank with only one office cannot acquire a
substantial market share. In Seattle, for example, the Bank of California, with only one
office, accounted for 6.27% of deposits in that market, and the Bank of California-Tacoma
accounted for 15.5% of the total deposits in Tacoma. Other banks with several branches in
these cities had lesser market shares. Marine, 418 U.S. at 649 n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
In light of these facts, it is not apparent why one of the smaller banks, such as, American
Commercial Bank, would not have qualified as a viable, toehold candidate. After acquisition
NBC would have been confined to the four branches operated by American Commercial
Bank, but this limitation would not be out of line with the branching position of at least one
of the other major competitors, Seattle First National Bank, which is confined by the state
branching law to its present seven branches.
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An unrealistic burden of proof is imposed if the party challeng-
ing the merger must demonstrate that the acquiring company's
alternate means of entry entailed a prospect of substantial decon-
centration. Even if it is more likely that de novo entry presents a
prospect of substantial deconcentration in other industries, which do
not have such difficult barriers to entry and expansion as are present
in banking, it is futile to speculate whether new entrants will be
successful and whether new entry will be attended by an improved
market structure. Too many factors beyond the possible knowledge
of the litigants are involved in the future development of the mar-
ket. More important, while merger policy is concerned with future
market structure, it is unrealistic to attempt to assess the impact of a
single hypothetical acquisition upon the future structure of the mar-
ket.
V. CONCLUSION
Three possible limitations upon the potential competition doc-
trine are reflected in Marine and Connecticut National. In Marine,
the majority of the Court explicitly confined its conclusion that the
relevant geographic market is the area in which the acquired com-
pany is a direct competitor to "a potential competition case like this
one." 140 Secondly, the Court expressly disavowed any intent to resolve
the status of the actual potential entrant theory.'"' Finally, the impact,
if any, that the requirement of a prospect for substantial deconcentra-
tion will have upon potential entry in other industries, or even entry in
the context of a less restrictive regulatory scheme, is unclear. How-
ever, it is too early to tell whether any of these limitations will be
adopted by the Court beyond the confines of the peculiar regulatory
schemes in Marine and Connecticut National. On balance, however;
these notions appear to reflect a less hospitable attitude toward expan-
sion of section 7 enforcement than has prevailed in recent years.
14° 418 U.S. at 622. However, the language in the Connecticut Bank opinion is not so
dearly confined, See note 70 supra.
14 ' 418 U.S. 'at 639.
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